God from the Philosophical Perspective
I don't find that Faith and Philosophy are mutually exclusive. While there is certainly a history of suspicion between proponents of the two - I've found that the philosophical exercise has added to my appreciation of Grace - has resensitized me to the gift of the moment. I wrote the following piece evaluating a philosophical argument for God's existence - attempting to integrate an old argument with recent science. I'm a student at this, far from having the tools of a true professional - but I enjoyed the experience all the same!
I want to focus my discussion of these issues in relation to the Kalām Cosmological Argument as articulated by William Lane Craig, and as critiqued by Paul Draper. In particular, I want to dissect the concept of “Beginning,” as represented in the argument and the critique. I believe that Craig and Draper miss a few points worthy of discussion, and that those missed points not only provide a different view of the argument as written, but actually convert certain objections into Kalām-strengthening assertions. Before I lay my thoughts out, though, let me state two principles imparted to me by the Philosophy Department at Parkside that are germane to this discussion. The first principle is, be modest. I am not a mathematician, a physicist nor a philosopher, let alone a theoretician. And yet a serious discussion of the origins of the universe, perhaps a cosmological proof of God, would necessarily require extreme agility within all of those disciplines. My hope then is not to refute or prove one position or another; rather, I hope just to raise some interesting questions related to the Kalām argument such that it cannot be rejected out of hand.
The second principle is to be rigorously clear in terms of which discipline is being discussed and the implications of the point in question. For example, it might be very enticing to seize the quantum theory of uncertainty and project that concept of subatomic location and velocity probability into a philosophical explanation reconciling God’s omniscience and man’s free-will. This mixing of disciplines is inherently dangerous as there is much room to exploit theoretical mathematical or physics formulations out of context to support philosophical positions. More simply, it is easy to overreach philosophically and I will try to avoid that.
1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Briefly, the issue where I intend to expend the most effort is with the idea of “begins,” and from there to consider what that might mean for the universe. “Begins” is inextricably tied to some conception of time – and it is that concept which is of most interest to me. First, though, I will summarize Craig’s main points and defense and Draper’s main objections and rationale. Craig and Draper, alternatively, spend a great deal of time on the concept of finite and infinite sets. Craig develops two arguments from mathematics that refute the existence of actually infinite sets or their physical development . He then asserts that the temporal past, therefore, cannot be infinite, cannot be an infinite constructed event by event, and therefore must have a beginning event – hence the universe has a beginning. This is Craig’s crucial move to validate premise 2).
He spends less time defending premise 1), causality. He quotes Hume, “But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause.” And he treats an objection to causality of J.L. Mackie by quoting Mackie himself, “Still this [causal] principle has some plausibility, in that it is constantly confirmed in our experience (and also used, reasonably, in interpreting our experience).” Craig then states in defense of the premise of causality, “So why not accept the truth of the causal principle as plausible and reasonable – at the very least more so than its denial?” At this point Craig sums up his argument with, “We thus have two separate arguments to prove that the universe began to exist, one based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things and one on the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection by successive addition.”
Draper attacks both of those arguments in his critique. He first disposes of the successive addition argument as follows, “Rather, it has always been the case that the collection of past events is infinite. Thus, if the temporal regress of events is infinite, then the temporal series of events is not an infinite collection formed by successively adding to a finite collection. Rather, it is a collection formed by successively adding to an infinite collection. And surely it is not impossible to form an infinite collection by successively adding to an already infinite collection.” He concedes that if a finite collection did exist that, yes, you cannot create an infinite collection by successive addition. But, he challenges Craig’s notion by suggesting that the universe never had a finite number of past events to begin with, and therefore a beginning event to the universe does not follow from the argument. Draper also takes on the impossibility of actual infinite existing in reality. Frankly, the math Draper uses (an inconsistent triad within set theory, Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers, etc) to challenge Craig’s assertion that an actual infinite cannot exist is patently beyond me. I can superficially follow the moves but have no background from which to claim that either philosopher wins his point.
Draper, though, further alleges that Craig has committed a fallacy of equivocation in his treatment of the verb “to begin.” Draper makes a distinction between “to begin within time,” and “to begin with time.” Draper asserts that Craig equivocates from the first premise to the second;
"The first premise is that anything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. Craig defends this premise by claiming that it is an ‘empirical generalization enjoying the strongest support experience affords.’ But experience only supports the claim that anything that begins to exist within time has a cause of its existence. For we have no experience whatsoever of things beginning to exist with time. Like an infinitely old universe, a universe that begins to exist with time has always existed, for any time t, the universe existed at t. And once again, it’s far from obvious that something that has always existed requires a cause for its existence. It’s not even clear that such a thing could have a cause of its existence."
Draper exercises some philosophical modesty himself by stating, “Or perhaps it could be shown that the universe began to exist with time and that even something that begins to exist with time requires a cause of its existence. So my conclusion is not that the Kalām argument should be dismissed. It is just that is has not yet been adequately defended.” It is at this point that I will start to develop what I believe are interesting considerations regarding the Kalām argument.
The uncertainty is stated as such, “The problem whether the world was created out of nothing or out of pre-existent eternal matter appeared in the Kalām under the guise of the problem whether the nonexistent is nothing or something.” Dr. Wolfson goes on to say that, “The real and vital problem, which to our mind is behind the discussion as to whether the ‘nonexistent’ is ‘nothing’ or ‘something,’ is the problem whether the world was created out of nothing or out of an antemundane matter. On this point, the Koran is quite explicit. Restating the words of the Hebrew Scripture, it says: ‘We created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in six days.’ But as to the manner of creation, whether ex nihilo or from a pre-existent matter and, if the latter, whether that pre-existent matter was created or eternal, is, as we have seen, not clear.”
1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
That there may have been pre-existing matter, and whether that matter was eternal or not, muddies the argument for Craig. Premise 1) is on shaky ground because if “nothing” turns out to be “something,” particularly an eternal “something,” then he loses, I believe, the sense of “begins” that he needs to conclude, 3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Craig’s defense might be that, even given something other than creation ex nihilo, premises 1) and 2) are unfazed. Still, it seems to me for an argument positing a first cause of the universe, the uncertainty of ex nihilo creation poses a difficulty. Craig does answer this inquiry with, “Whether this production involves transformation of already existing materials or creation out of nothing is an incidental question.” I’m not certain if that is fully true. As follows:
1) Certain material exists eternally.
2) The universe consists of certain material.
3) Therefore, the universe is eternal.
This is the sense in which Craig’s formulation loses ground. However, Draper loses his allegation of equivocation if the universe did not come to be ex nihilo. Draper bases his objection on the changing signification of “beginning within time,” and “beginning with time.” As I stated earlier, the concept of beginning is tied to some conception of time, and if the universe did come to be after a state of not being, after some state of material “nonexistence,” then his distinction might lack content, as follows:
1) Certain material exits eternally within time.
2) The universe consists of certain material.
3) Therefore, the universe exists within time.
It is quite likely that I haven’t raised any new points, or advanced the argument one way or another by considering the uncertainty of ex nihilo creation – I may be off the mark entirely. But it seems to me there is something missing from the discussion to focus almost solely on mathematical controversies regarding the potential of an actual infinite as a means to validating or refuting premises 1) and 2) of the original argument. Although there is good historical precedent for that focus, as the argument for creation “From the impossibility of an infinite by succession,” is treated as, “By a long argument Aristotle first arrives at the conclusion that ‘there is no body which is actually infinite.’” My only response to this is, “Whether a given argument constitutes a proof or not can vary from time to time, depending upon the state of what is known by the community of scholars…upon the status its premises hold within the body of human ‘scientific’ knowledge at the time.”
To begin, Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity; “A less than widely appreciated implication of Einstein’s work is that special relativistic reality treats all times equally. Although the notion of now plays a central role in our world view, relativity subverts our intuition once again and declares ours an egalitarian universe in which every moment is as real as any other. Suggesting, as Einstein believed, that reality embraces past, present, and future equally and that the flow (of time) we envision bringing one section to light as another goes dark is illusory.” In essence, our “now” event is some one else’s “future” event, separated by X number of light years – subsequently, what we hold for us as happening right “now,” happened in some one else’s past separated by X number of light years. There have been, and continue to be, complete volumes written on this concept. The theoreticians don’t completely understand the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity on the cosmological level – far be it for me to integrate this into the Kalām Cosmological Argument. But if I were pressed, it might look something like this;
1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) All causes are relational.
3) Therefore, all beginnings are relational.
And here the lessons of my father come back to me; “A place for everything and everything in its place,” past, present and future on equal terms and in their place as a matter of perspective. “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander,” in that Special Relativity posits a coexisting past and future as we anthropomorphically understand them. And, “Every action has a reaction,” which I’m not really sure if that’s pertinent or not – but if causality in this scheme is valid, then we don’t fully understand the reaction, or implications, of that action.
At the back of his book, The Fabric of the Cosmos, Brian Greene makes this statement in summation of nearly 500 pages reviewing cutting-edge mathematical and cosmological theory, “The essential point would be that the distinction between space-time and more tangible material entities would largely evaporate, as they would both emerge from appropriate aggregates of more basic ingredients in a theory that’s fundamentally relational, spaceless, and timeless. If this is how it turns out, Leibniz, Newton, Mach, and Einstein could all claim a share of the victory.”
More strongly than ever, I am convinced that God cannot be deduced or induced from the natural world, validly – yet, as you point out Dr. XXXXX, that doesn’t prove the non-existence of God either; the problem of Evil does, though, present some difficult issues as to the nature of an omnipotent being.
Draper, Paul. A Critique of the Kalām Cosmological Argument, (1997) Ed. Pojman, L. Philosophy of Religion, an Anthology, (2003), Wadsworth/Thomson Learning / Belmont, CA.
Greene, Brian. The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality. (2004). Alfred A. Knopf / New York.
Ross, James F. On the Proofs for the Existence of God. (1970). Ed. Donnelly, J. Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism. (1972). Fordham University Press / New York.
Wofson, Harry A. The Philosophy of the Kalam. (1976). Harvard University Press / Cambridge, MA.
A Rejoinder to the Critique of the Kalām Cosmological Argument
I. Introduction
My father taught me a few important lessons when I was a child; “A place for everything and everything in its place.” He also taught me that, “Every action has a reaction,” and “What is good for the goose is good for the gander.” These lessons were meant, in my case, to impart discipline – I should keep my room clean, if I misbehaved I should very well expect consequences, and because I have a brother the discipline he received was good enough for me as well. Little did I know, but he was actually teaching me some fundamental laws of physics and thermodynamics. I am not certain my father was aware of this either – although the lessons achieved their desired affect. What I am certain of, though, is how unlikely it is that I would be considering the memory of these lessons forty years later in thinking about the likelihood of the creation of the universe. And, if the creation of the universe did occur does that event entail a creator? Further, does a valid syllogism exist that contains the premises of necessary creation, scientific observation, and the logical conclusion of God?I want to focus my discussion of these issues in relation to the Kalām Cosmological Argument as articulated by William Lane Craig, and as critiqued by Paul Draper. In particular, I want to dissect the concept of “Beginning,” as represented in the argument and the critique. I believe that Craig and Draper miss a few points worthy of discussion, and that those missed points not only provide a different view of the argument as written, but actually convert certain objections into Kalām-strengthening assertions. Before I lay my thoughts out, though, let me state two principles imparted to me by the Philosophy Department at Parkside that are germane to this discussion. The first principle is, be modest. I am not a mathematician, a physicist nor a philosopher, let alone a theoretician. And yet a serious discussion of the origins of the universe, perhaps a cosmological proof of God, would necessarily require extreme agility within all of those disciplines. My hope then is not to refute or prove one position or another; rather, I hope just to raise some interesting questions related to the Kalām argument such that it cannot be rejected out of hand.
The second principle is to be rigorously clear in terms of which discipline is being discussed and the implications of the point in question. For example, it might be very enticing to seize the quantum theory of uncertainty and project that concept of subatomic location and velocity probability into a philosophical explanation reconciling God’s omniscience and man’s free-will. This mixing of disciplines is inherently dangerous as there is much room to exploit theoretical mathematical or physics formulations out of context to support philosophical positions. More simply, it is easy to overreach philosophically and I will try to avoid that.
II. Kalām Cosmological Argument as stated by Craig and Critiqued by Draper
The argument as developed by Craig is simplicity itself :1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Briefly, the issue where I intend to expend the most effort is with the idea of “begins,” and from there to consider what that might mean for the universe. “Begins” is inextricably tied to some conception of time – and it is that concept which is of most interest to me. First, though, I will summarize Craig’s main points and defense and Draper’s main objections and rationale. Craig and Draper, alternatively, spend a great deal of time on the concept of finite and infinite sets. Craig develops two arguments from mathematics that refute the existence of actually infinite sets or their physical development . He then asserts that the temporal past, therefore, cannot be infinite, cannot be an infinite constructed event by event, and therefore must have a beginning event – hence the universe has a beginning. This is Craig’s crucial move to validate premise 2).
He spends less time defending premise 1), causality. He quotes Hume, “But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause.” And he treats an objection to causality of J.L. Mackie by quoting Mackie himself, “Still this [causal] principle has some plausibility, in that it is constantly confirmed in our experience (and also used, reasonably, in interpreting our experience).” Craig then states in defense of the premise of causality, “So why not accept the truth of the causal principle as plausible and reasonable – at the very least more so than its denial?” At this point Craig sums up his argument with, “We thus have two separate arguments to prove that the universe began to exist, one based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things and one on the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection by successive addition.”
Draper attacks both of those arguments in his critique. He first disposes of the successive addition argument as follows, “Rather, it has always been the case that the collection of past events is infinite. Thus, if the temporal regress of events is infinite, then the temporal series of events is not an infinite collection formed by successively adding to a finite collection. Rather, it is a collection formed by successively adding to an infinite collection. And surely it is not impossible to form an infinite collection by successively adding to an already infinite collection.” He concedes that if a finite collection did exist that, yes, you cannot create an infinite collection by successive addition. But, he challenges Craig’s notion by suggesting that the universe never had a finite number of past events to begin with, and therefore a beginning event to the universe does not follow from the argument. Draper also takes on the impossibility of actual infinite existing in reality. Frankly, the math Draper uses (an inconsistent triad within set theory, Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers, etc) to challenge Craig’s assertion that an actual infinite cannot exist is patently beyond me. I can superficially follow the moves but have no background from which to claim that either philosopher wins his point.
Draper, though, further alleges that Craig has committed a fallacy of equivocation in his treatment of the verb “to begin.” Draper makes a distinction between “to begin within time,” and “to begin with time.” Draper asserts that Craig equivocates from the first premise to the second;
"The first premise is that anything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. Craig defends this premise by claiming that it is an ‘empirical generalization enjoying the strongest support experience affords.’ But experience only supports the claim that anything that begins to exist within time has a cause of its existence. For we have no experience whatsoever of things beginning to exist with time. Like an infinitely old universe, a universe that begins to exist with time has always existed, for any time t, the universe existed at t. And once again, it’s far from obvious that something that has always existed requires a cause for its existence. It’s not even clear that such a thing could have a cause of its existence."
Draper exercises some philosophical modesty himself by stating, “Or perhaps it could be shown that the universe began to exist with time and that even something that begins to exist with time requires a cause of its existence. So my conclusion is not that the Kalām argument should be dismissed. It is just that is has not yet been adequately defended.” It is at this point that I will start to develop what I believe are interesting considerations regarding the Kalām argument.
III. The Kalām
As this particular formulation of the cosmological argument bears the name Kalām, it merits a few comments as to what that means. “The term kalām, which literally means ‘speech’ or ‘word,’ is used in Arabic translations of the works of Greek philosophers as a rendering of the term logos in its various senses of ‘word,’ ‘reason,’ and ‘argument.’” More broadly though, “The term kalām, without any qualification, was applied to a particular system of thought which arose in Islam prior to the rise of philosophy, and its exponents, called simply mutakallimūn, were contrasted with those who, beginning with al-Kindī (d. ca. 873), were called simply philosophers.” Now, the late Dr. Wolfson created a veritable tome on the philosophy of the Kalām. It is a densely written treatise ranging over 740 pages. Suffice it to say that the genesis of the modern Kalām Cosmological Argument for God’s existence resides squarely within ninth century A.D. Islamic interpretations of Aristotle and Plato, to name a few. However, there is a difficulty, or an uncertainty, within Kalām philosophy regarding the creation of the universe that I believe introduces an interesting twist to Craig’s and Draper’s discussion of the modern argument. And by extension, leads to some thoughts I have about the operation of time.The uncertainty is stated as such, “The problem whether the world was created out of nothing or out of pre-existent eternal matter appeared in the Kalām under the guise of the problem whether the nonexistent is nothing or something.” Dr. Wolfson goes on to say that, “The real and vital problem, which to our mind is behind the discussion as to whether the ‘nonexistent’ is ‘nothing’ or ‘something,’ is the problem whether the world was created out of nothing or out of an antemundane matter. On this point, the Koran is quite explicit. Restating the words of the Hebrew Scripture, it says: ‘We created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in six days.’ But as to the manner of creation, whether ex nihilo or from a pre-existent matter and, if the latter, whether that pre-existent matter was created or eternal, is, as we have seen, not clear.”
IV. Ex Nihilo
In one sense this uncertainty weakens the Kalām Cosmological Argument. Certainly what Craig is driving at is a mathematical singularity – a finite point in the history of the universe, a beginning of temporal matter brought into existence by a cause, ex nihilo.1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
That there may have been pre-existing matter, and whether that matter was eternal or not, muddies the argument for Craig. Premise 1) is on shaky ground because if “nothing” turns out to be “something,” particularly an eternal “something,” then he loses, I believe, the sense of “begins” that he needs to conclude, 3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Craig’s defense might be that, even given something other than creation ex nihilo, premises 1) and 2) are unfazed. Still, it seems to me for an argument positing a first cause of the universe, the uncertainty of ex nihilo creation poses a difficulty. Craig does answer this inquiry with, “Whether this production involves transformation of already existing materials or creation out of nothing is an incidental question.” I’m not certain if that is fully true. As follows:
1) Certain material exists eternally.
2) The universe consists of certain material.
3) Therefore, the universe is eternal.
This is the sense in which Craig’s formulation loses ground. However, Draper loses his allegation of equivocation if the universe did not come to be ex nihilo. Draper bases his objection on the changing signification of “beginning within time,” and “beginning with time.” As I stated earlier, the concept of beginning is tied to some conception of time, and if the universe did come to be after a state of not being, after some state of material “nonexistence,” then his distinction might lack content, as follows:
1) Certain material exits eternally within time.
2) The universe consists of certain material.
3) Therefore, the universe exists within time.
It is quite likely that I haven’t raised any new points, or advanced the argument one way or another by considering the uncertainty of ex nihilo creation – I may be off the mark entirely. But it seems to me there is something missing from the discussion to focus almost solely on mathematical controversies regarding the potential of an actual infinite as a means to validating or refuting premises 1) and 2) of the original argument. Although there is good historical precedent for that focus, as the argument for creation “From the impossibility of an infinite by succession,” is treated as, “By a long argument Aristotle first arrives at the conclusion that ‘there is no body which is actually infinite.’” My only response to this is, “Whether a given argument constitutes a proof or not can vary from time to time, depending upon the state of what is known by the community of scholars…upon the status its premises hold within the body of human ‘scientific’ knowledge at the time.”
V. Time
So, what is known today by the community of scholars? Well, in terms of the beginning of the universe, a great deal actually. Here I must exercise great caution because I’ll be referring to principles, or theories, that I can only appreciate marginally – that apparently move seamlessly from theoretical mathematics to theoretical cosmology – and predict some outlandish observations that bear on the Kalām Cosmological argument.To begin, Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity; “A less than widely appreciated implication of Einstein’s work is that special relativistic reality treats all times equally. Although the notion of now plays a central role in our world view, relativity subverts our intuition once again and declares ours an egalitarian universe in which every moment is as real as any other. Suggesting, as Einstein believed, that reality embraces past, present, and future equally and that the flow (of time) we envision bringing one section to light as another goes dark is illusory.” In essence, our “now” event is some one else’s “future” event, separated by X number of light years – subsequently, what we hold for us as happening right “now,” happened in some one else’s past separated by X number of light years. There have been, and continue to be, complete volumes written on this concept. The theoreticians don’t completely understand the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity on the cosmological level – far be it for me to integrate this into the Kalām Cosmological Argument. But if I were pressed, it might look something like this;
1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) All causes are relational.
3) Therefore, all beginnings are relational.
And here the lessons of my father come back to me; “A place for everything and everything in its place,” past, present and future on equal terms and in their place as a matter of perspective. “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander,” in that Special Relativity posits a coexisting past and future as we anthropomorphically understand them. And, “Every action has a reaction,” which I’m not really sure if that’s pertinent or not – but if causality in this scheme is valid, then we don’t fully understand the reaction, or implications, of that action.
At the back of his book, The Fabric of the Cosmos, Brian Greene makes this statement in summation of nearly 500 pages reviewing cutting-edge mathematical and cosmological theory, “The essential point would be that the distinction between space-time and more tangible material entities would largely evaporate, as they would both emerge from appropriate aggregates of more basic ingredients in a theory that’s fundamentally relational, spaceless, and timeless. If this is how it turns out, Leibniz, Newton, Mach, and Einstein could all claim a share of the victory.”
VI. Conclusion
As has been drummed into me these past two years, philosophy seeks to develop logically sound arguments based on valid premises that eventually lead to coherent theories. Within the group of arguments for the proof of God, I believe a variant on the Cosmological Argument – perhaps the Kalām Argument – will continue to bring philosophers back to the table. Though the ontological and teleological arguments are logically sound, with their conclusions solid if their premises were valid – their premises are easily attacked. God proved by the thought of God doesn’t seem to achieve escape velocity, nor does the argument from design, as design implies purpose, and where would we possibly go in determining the “purpose” of the universe? However, when we overcome our current “writer’s block” in reconciling quantum theory with Einstein’s math and gain some clarity to the first micro-seconds of our receding universe – we might discover a theory that is “spaceless and timeless,” as Greene suggests. And having done so, we will still be faced with the genesis of existence. Clearly, (as my fellow philosophy student, Grace, so astutely pointed out in our Epistemology class), there is an asymptote here that the equation will simply never intersect.More strongly than ever, I am convinced that God cannot be deduced or induced from the natural world, validly – yet, as you point out Dr. XXXXX, that doesn’t prove the non-existence of God either; the problem of Evil does, though, present some difficult issues as to the nature of an omnipotent being.
Works cited
Craig, William L. The Kalām Cosmological Argument, (1944) Ed. Pojman, L. Philosophy of Religion, an Anthology, (2003), Wadsworth/Thomson Learning / Belmont, CA.Draper, Paul. A Critique of the Kalām Cosmological Argument, (1997) Ed. Pojman, L. Philosophy of Religion, an Anthology, (2003), Wadsworth/Thomson Learning / Belmont, CA.
Greene, Brian. The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality. (2004). Alfred A. Knopf / New York.
Ross, James F. On the Proofs for the Existence of God. (1970). Ed. Donnelly, J. Logical Analysis and Contemporary Theism. (1972). Fordham University Press / New York.
Wofson, Harry A. The Philosophy of the Kalam. (1976). Harvard University Press / Cambridge, MA.
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